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It is now widely recognized among classicists that in the culture of 
classical Greece, that is, in the fifth to fourth century B.C.E., the element of 
“performance” played a prominent role in various aspects of daily life. The 
term “performance culture” is often applied to classical Greece, especially to 
Athens, in reference to many areas where the citizens conducted their 
activities in public, such as dramatic and poetic competitions, athletic 
competitions, and debates in the democratic assembly and in the law court.   
All these activities that took place in public were highly competitive, though 
in different contexts, and demonstration of one’s excellence in performance 
mattered a great deal in them.1   
Connected to this is another distinctive characteristic of life in 
classical Athens: that is, the still predominantly oral presentation of poetic 
works and political and philosophical ideas. Despite the gradual spread of 
alphabetic writing,2 the importance of oral communication in the intellectual 
life of Athens persisted well into the classical period.3 However, this was 
also undoubtedly a period of transition when the increasing importance of 
                                                
1 For classical Greece as a performance culture, see Hall 1998. The term 
“performance culture” to cover various public activities appears to be further justified by 
the similarity of “audience” reaction in different categories of performance, as 
documented in Wallace 1997.  
 
2 The earliest evidence for the Greek alphabet dates from the eighth century 
B.C.E. For a brief history of the Greek alphabet, see “Alphabet, Greek” in Hornblower 
and Spawforth 1996:66.  
 
3 Cf. Havelock 1963 for the most influential expression of this observation.  See 
also Harris 1989: ch. 4, espec. 72-73. 
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writing had begun to affect the way people published or otherwise 
disseminated their works and ideas.4   
In this paper I am going to take Plato’s writings, especially his 
philosophical dialogues Ion and Phaedrus, as a snapshot of this transitional 
period to examine in some detail what was happening to the hitherto mostly 
oral culture. I have chosen these two dialogues in order to see how Plato 
represented the performance of poetry and of rhetorical speeches, 
respectively. By doing so I hope to gather some evidence for how 
performance was recorded, memorized, and retrieved, and how such 
retrieval or representation was regarded by the Greeks in the late fifth and 
fourth centuries B.C.E. at the time of Socrates and Plato.  What forms did 
those representations take and how did they compare with the “real thing,” 
that is, the live performances? 
Plato’s dialogue Ion provides the best evidence for how Homer’s 
poetry was performed in Plato’s day because of its subject matter: Socrates’ 
conversation with Ion, a leading rhapsode of Homeric poems. Socrates’ tone 
is ironic throughout, friendly but often teasing, as he plays along with Ion’s 
overconfidence in his ability and value as a rhapsode.5 Ion, on the other 
hand, does not seem aware of Socrates’ irony, taking his double-edged 
compliments at their face value. The gap of awareness between the two 
interlocutors gives this dialogue a humorous touch, which veils Plato’s 
attack on the claim of poetry as a vehicle of truth.   
Almost as soon as the dialogue opens, Socrates challenges Ion in a 
most courteous and ironic way (530b-c). He says that he is envious of the 
rhapsodes like Ion for their art (tekhnê), which allows them to dress up and 
look glamorous,6 and to have intimate knowledge of many fine poets, 
                                                
4 Cf. Thomas 2003. For detailed examinations of the issues relating to literacy and 
orality in classical Greece, see Thomas 1989 and 1992.  
 
5 Rhapsodes (rhapsôidoi) in Plato’s time were performers who recited epic poetry, 
especially that of Homer; unlike poets (poiêtai), they did not compose poems by 
themselves. However, the term was applied to poet-performers in earlier periods. Cf.  
Gentili 1988:6-7.  
 
6 This is an indirect reference to one of the performance aspects of the rhapsode’s 
art, costume. Costume as a significant element in the performance of poetry and even 
oratory can also be glimpsed in Plato, Hippias Minor 368b-d, where the sophist Hippias’ 
works on display include not only poetry and prose speeches, but also self-made jewelry, 
clothes, and the shoes he is wearing. See also Plato, Hippias Major 291a for the mention 
of Hippias’ fine clothes and shoes. All this is in stark contrast with Socrates’ well-known 
neglect of his appearance and comfort, especially with his barefootedness (see, e.g., 
Plato, Symposium 220b).   
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especially Homer. He goes on to say that a good rhapsode would necessarily 
have proper understanding of the poet’s words because he has to interpret 
the poet’s thought for the audience. That, he says, is worthy of envy.   
In these words, Socrates is setting out his program of discrediting the 
rhapsodes, and through them Homer himself, as educators of Greece.7  In the 
course of the dialogue, Ion is reduced to admitting that, although rhapsodes 
have some knowledge of all the matters Homer addresses, such as how to 
drive a chariot or how to be a commander of an army, they can only be 
inferior judges to the experts in each technical matter concerned. Ion is 
supposed to be a leading performer of Homeric poems as well as a critic of 
Homeric poetry at the time (530c-d), but apparently cannot even pinpoint the 
nature of his own expertise. The only honorable way out for him in the end 
is to agree to Socrates’ view that the rhapsode can perform or praise 
Homer’s poems well, not as a result of his skill (tekhnê) or knowledge 
(epistêmê), but by divine dispensation, or more simply, by being divine 
(theios) (541e-42b).   
Plato’s Socrates introduces his idea of poets and rhapsodes as divinely 
inspired beings in his striking simile of the magnet and iron rings. The Muse 
is likened to a magnet that attracts iron (533e-34a):8   
 
The result is sometimes quite a long chain of rings and scraps of iron 
suspended from one another, all of them depending on that stone for their 
power. Similarly, the Muse herself makes some men inspired (entheous), 
from whom a chain of other men is strung out who catch their own 
inspiration from theirs. For all good epic poets recite all that splendid 
poetry not by virtue of a skill, but in a state of inspiration and possession.  
The same is true of good lyric poets as well: just as Corybantic 
worshippers dance without being in control of their senses, so too it’s 
when they are not in control of their senses that the lyric poets compose 
those fine lyric poems. But once launched into their rhythm and musical 
mode, they catch a Bacchic frenzy: they are possessed, just like Bacchic 
women, who when possessed and out of their senses draw milk and honey 
from rivers—exactly what the souls of the lyric poets do, as they say 
themselves. 
 
It must surely be significant that similes, which are very common literary 
devices in Homer, are employed here to convince Ion, the professional 
                                                
7 For the idea of Homer as the educator of Greece, cf. Plato, Republic 606e and 
Verdenius 1970. For Homer’s continuing influence on ancient Greeks and Romans, 
especially on education and rhetoric, see North 1952.  
 
8 The quotations from Ion in this article are taken from Saunders 1987 with 
occasional modification and some transliterated Greek words inserted as necessary.  
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performer of Homeric poems. Later on, the chain is further extended to 
include rhapsodes and other performers who catch inspiration from the 
poets, and through them their spectators (535e-36b). It is notable that 
Socrates compares the inspired state of the poets to a Bacchic frenzy 
(bakkheuousi) in which the affected person is “possessed” (katekhomenoi) 
(534a).  
The idea of poetry as a product of divine inspiration has a long 
tradition, evident since the oldest poets in Greece, Homer and Hesiod. After 
all, Homer begins his Iliad with the line “Sing Goddess, the anger of Peleus’ 
son Achilleus.” The line implies that it is the goddess Muse who does the 
singing, and the poet is merely her mouthpiece.9 Socrates turns this very 
convention against the poets to undermine their claim to any skill (tekhnê).10  
He says that the poet (poiêtês) has to be inspired (entheos) and out of his 
mind (ekphrôn), with his sense (nous) no longer within him, in order to be 
able to compose his poems (Ion 534b). To enhance this view Socrates paints 
a convincing picture of the psychology of epic performance (535b-c): 
 
When you give a performance of epic and stun your audience, and you 
sing (âidêis)11 of Odysseus leaping onto the threshold and revealing 
himself to the suitors and pouring forth his arrows before his feet, or of 
Achilles rushing at Hector, or one of those piteous episodes about 
Andromache or Hecuba or Priam, are you, at that moment, in control of 
your senses? Or are you taken out of yourself, and does your soul, inspired 
as it is, imagine itself present at the events you describe—either at Ithaca 
or Troy or wherever else the scene of the epic is set? 
 
To this Ion can only agree (535c), saying that when he says something 
piteous, his eyes fill with tears, and when singing something frightening or 
                                                
9 Cf. the opening lines of Homer’s Odyssey and Hesiod’s Works and Days, where 
the poet also calls to the Muse(s) to relate the poem. In the Theogony Hesiod describes 
how he met the Muses on Mt. Helicon and received the gift of poetry from them (22-34).  
For further Homeric and Hesiodic references on divine inspiration, see Sperduti 1950: 
espec. 224-25 and 228-29.    
 
10 The words tekhnê (“skill”) and  epistêmê (“knowledge”)—used synonymously 
in this dialogue—are denied to poets or rhapsodes in Socrates’ analysis.  See Murray 
(1996:108) on Ion 532c6.   
 
11 This word alludes to the mode of delivery of epic poetry. The poems were 
apparently melodiously chanted with (originally) or without (by Plato’s day) the 
accompaniment of the lyre.  Cf. “Rhapsodes” in Hornblower and Spawforth 1996:1311-
12.    
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terrible, his hair stands on end and his heart thumps. When Socrates asks if 
he is aware that his audience is similarly affected, Ion agrees again (535e): 
 
Yes, I’m very well aware of it.  At each performance, I look down on them 
from up there on the platform as they weep and look at me with dire 
emotion in their eyes, in amazement at my story.  You see, I have to pay a 
lot of attention to them—since if I make them cry I shall laugh all the way 
to the bank, whereas if I provoke their laughter it’s I who’ll do the crying, 
for loss of my money.   
 
We may detect a touch of cynicism on the part of Plato here.  On the 
one hand, he is presenting a deliberately exaggerated picture of the divine 
poet or performer who composes or performs in the state of “madness.” On 
the other hand, he paints a realistic picture of a professional performer fully 
aware of the audience’s reaction and its financial result.12 The power of 
performance and an audience’s fascination with it obviously existed, as it 
does today, but this was an age of reason that no longer believed in divine 
inspiration as depicted in Homer, or not literally at any rate. It is perfectly 
possible that the idea of Muse-inspired poetry was more or less the “official” 
view maintained by the Greeks since Homer even down to Plato’s day, but 
the idea that poets compose and performers perform in a state of “divine 
madness” where they lack control of their senses is not a common view in 
ancient Greece, and more likely to be a Platonic “myth.”13 On the evidence 
of this dialogue, it is hard to think that Plato sincerely believed that poets 
composed or performed in a frenzied state.  Even Ion himself protests that he 
is not “possessed and frenzied” (katekhomenos kai mainomenos, 536d) when 
he is commenting on Homer’s poetry.  
The exact nature of divine inspiration in ancient Greek literature is a 
subject of much debate. In Homer, there is no sign of divine madness or 
frenzy in the cases of the bards Demodocus and Phemius. In fact Phemius 
says that he is “self-taught” but the songs are “planted by the gods” (Od. 
22.347-48), suggesting the co-existence of divine inspiration and human 
                                                
12 Cf. Weineck 1998:30: “he is quite conscious of manipulating his audience, and 
his own passions are diametrically opposed to those of his listeners instead of being 
‘magnetically’ related to them.” 
 
13 Cf. Murray 1992:34. The earliest extant source of the notion of the frenzied 
poet is Democritus (mid-fifth to mid-fourth century B.C.E.; in Diels 1952:fr. 17 and fr. 
18), but it appears that Plato is the author most responsible for propagating the idea.  Cf. 
Dodds 1951:82; Tigerstedt 1969:espec. 66-67.     
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technique.14 Penelope Murray (1999:32) observes that Demodocus’ art is 
also described in the Odyssey (8.44-45) as both god-given and the product of 
his own mind (thûmos). Pausanias (9.29.2) records an old tradition in which 
there were three Muses, Meletê (Study), Mnêmê (Memory) and Aoidê 
(Song) whose names also seem to point to both divine and human aspects of 
the Muses’ art. As Detienne puts it (1996:41), “Meletê designated the 
discipline indispensable to any bardic apprentice: attention, concentration, 
and mental exercise.” This seems to indicate the important part played by the 
conscious human effort in the creation and performance of poetry, far from 
the image of the frenzied divine poet who is “out of his mind,” and also 
incidentally points to the close connection between memory and poetry (cf. 
Murray 1999:36). 
Anthropological studies have also taught us to be aware of different 
sorts of “divine” or trance-like inspiration found in various cultures around 
the world. Ruth Finnegan (1988:73-75) describes Eskimo poets’ deep poetic 
concentration during composition and cites an example from the southern 
Pacific where the poet is believed to receive divine inspiration to compose 
his “rough draft,” which is subsequently polished in consultation with 
others. From these as well as from other examples from the Pacific, 
Finnegan (ibid.:95-102) observes the recurring emphasis on divine 
inspiration as well as memorization in the composition of songs and dances. 
This seems to me to be akin to Homer’s notion of a poetic inspiration that 
does not work without conscious human endeavor.   
Felicia Hughes-Freeland’s (1997) description of the Javanese dance 
theory of Joged Mataram appears to shed further light on the nature of 
trance-like performance. According to the theory, “the experienced dancer 
ceases to experience the doing of the movements: the acquired habits of 
movement have their own momentum independent of the performer’s 
intention” (61) and “one is not aware of self or the audience, and one is 
aware of one’s fellow-dancers and the pillars on the stage to the extent that 
one does not collide with them” (64-65). This sort of balance between the 
performer being absorbed in the performance on the one hand and yet being 
conscious of the practicalities on the other, I imagine, could be found in 
almost any of the performing arts. In light of such comparative evidence, 
perhaps Plato’s description of Ion’s experience, which combines the 
“inspired” state and the pragmatic consciousness of the audience reaction, is 
not so cynical as it is realistic.   
The Ion incidentally provides us with the main evidence for how 
Homer was memorized and received in the late fifth to early fourth century 
                                                
14 Cf. Maehler 1999:7 and Macleod 1999:46.    
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B.C.E. While they are debating whether the rhapsode can be an expert on 
everything that Homer treated in his works, Socrates and Ion produce some 
quotations from Homer as pieces of evidence. The first example regarding 
chariot-driving is produced by Ion (537a-b, quoted from Il. 23.335-40), but 
Socrates never needs Ion’s help again, for he himself produces all the rest of 
the examples from Homer (three from the Iliad and one from the Odyssey; 
538c-d, 539a-d). To make Socrates outdo the professional in reciting Homer 
is surely Plato’s deliberate irony.   
Another remarkable point about this sequence is that Ion’s and the 
first three of Socrates’ Homeric examples are each slightly “misquoted” or at 
any rate noticeably different from the extant texts that we have. For 
example, the first line of Ion’s quotation (537a8-b5) reads: 
 
klinthênai de, phêsi, kai autos euxestôi eni diphrôi  
 
Lean over, he says, yourself also in your well-polished chariot. 
 
Whereas the corresponding line in Homer (Il. 23.335) of our extant text 
reads: 
 
 autos de klinthênai euplektôi eni diphrôi 
  
Yourself lean over in your well-plated chariot. 
 
So Plato makes Ion insert “he [i.e., Homer] says” and “also” into his quoted 
passage, changes the word order, and replaces euplektôi (“well-plated”) with 
euxestôi (“well-polished”). This variant reading is not found in any other 
manuscript tradition and the word order is so radically different that it is 
very unlikely to be a result of scribal errors. It is more likely to be Plato’s 
own “version” as a result of his citing from memory. And yet the line, with 
the words jumbled up and with the addition of one little word, kai (“and”), 
still scans correctly as hexameter, which makes it sound like a genuine 
Homeric line.   
The deviation from our text is even more pronounced in Socrates’ first 
quotation at 538c: 
 
oinôi pramneiôi, phêsin, epi d’ aigeion knê tûron 
knêsti khalkeiêi, para de kromuon potôi opson.  
 
of Pramneian wine, he says, and over it she grated the cheese of a goat, 
with a grater of bronze, and then an onion as relish for the drink. 
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This in fact is a mixture of Il. 11.639-40: 
 
oinôi pramneiôi, epi d’ aigeion knê tûron 
knêsti khalkeiêi, epi d’alphita leuka palune, 
 
of Pramneian wine, and over it she grated the cheese of a goat,  
with a greater of bronze, and sprinkled white barley over it, 
 
and of  Il. 11.630: 
 
  khalkeion kaneon, epi de kromuon potôi opson  
 
a bronze basket, and then an onion as relish for the drink. 
 
The proximity of the two Homeric passages, occurring within the same 
context (Hecamede serving food and drink to Machaon), and the presence of 
the word for bronze in both are likely to have triggered this confusion. 
Again, this variant is not attested in any other manuscript tradition, and 
highly unlikely to be a scribal error. It is most certainly Plato’s 
misquotation—“une défaillance de mémoire” as Labarbe puts it—but again 
the lines scan as hexameter verse, thus sounding like genuine Homeric 
lines.15   
What are we to make of such variations? Ion does not appear to notice 
these “errors,” either his own or Socrates’, despite the fact that he is 
supposed to be a leading expert in Homeric verse. Nor does it seem to matter 
to Socrates, who introduces his quotations by saying “he [Homer] puts it 
more or less like this” (538c). The most likely explanation is that Plato was 
not himself aware of making these mistakes, having quoted the Homeric 
lines from memory. This casual attitude to literary quotations is very 
common in Plato’s writings, reflecting no doubt the usual way people quoted 
Homer and other authors in their daily conversation. We might expect that 
professional rhapsodes in real life would have had a more accurate 
knowledge of Homeric verses than Plato, but it is not inconceivable that the 
sort of slight variations as we have seen in Ion’s quotation above could have 
naturally occurred in live performances. Comparative evidence seems to 
                                                
15 Cf. Labarbe 1949:104. Cf. Xenophon, Symposium 4.7, where the second half of 
Il. 11.630 is quoted correctly with epi. Plato refers to the same episode in Republic 405e-
06a, but misremembers the characters involved, substituting Eurypylus and Patroclus for 
Machaon and Hecamede. Cf. Murray 1996 on Ion 538c1. The other quotes by Socrates in 
the rest of the sequence have less radical variations. For further details, see Labarbe 
1949:88-136. 
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suggest that such inexact reproduction of verses is not uncommon in oral 
poetry, and we might be witnessing here one of the last stages of the oral 
transmission of Homeric texts in Plato’s dialogues, albeit only in 
quotations.16 We can also infer that educated Athenians such as Socrates and 
Plato knew enough Homer by heart not only to remember much of the texts 
correctly but also to recast, albeit inadvertently, original lines with different 
words or in different word order and still make them say roughly the same 
thing and scan as hexameter. Here is a hint of creative memory driven by the 
rhythm of the hexameter, which was no doubt drilled into the Greek mind 
from an early age.   
At this point it may be useful to have a general overview of Plato’s 
uses of Homer. Plato’s attack on poets, especially Homer, is well-known, but 
in fact his direct criticism of Homer is confined to only three dialogues, the 
Republic, where Socrates famously banishes poets from his ideal state 
(607a), Hippias Minor, and Ion, which we have just seen. Out of 35 
canonical dialogues (including the ones that are not thought to be by Plato 
himself), 30 of them contain Homeric references, either mentioning Homer 
as the poet par excellence or his characters as examples, or quoting or 
referring to his poems as a source of information of great authority that 
everyone knows and draws on.17   
It is ironic that despite his aspiration to replace Homer with 
philosophy as the new curriculum of education, or rather because of it, Plato 
had to use Homer to authenticate his arguments and to make his 
philosophical dialogues lively and natural. It was natural because Greeks in 
those days were educated with Homer’s texts and they quoted from them all 
the time.18 Hence, references to Homer formed a large part of the art of 
conversation and indeed of Socratic dialectic, too.19 The complete poems of 
Homer no doubt were available both as written texts and through public 
                                                
16 For the fluidity of oral poetry, see Lord 1960:99-123. 
 
17 For the most comprehensive survey to date of Homeric quotations and 
references, see Labarbe 1949.   
 
18 E.g., Plato’s Symposium and Xenophon’s Symposium, especially the case of 
Niceratus, whose father Nicias made him learn the entire Iliad and Odyssey (Xenophon, 
Symposium 3.5). Cf. Verdenius 1970.   
 
19 It appears that Socrates was particularly fond of quoting Homer, judging not 
only by Plato’s evidence but also Xenophon’s, who reports that Socrates was accused of 
constantly quoting a certain passage from Homer, Il. 2.188-91 and 198-202 (Memorabilia 
1.2.58). 
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performances, but the memorized texts (or parts of texts) had their own life, 
as it were. They had their mini-performances in daily conversations.   
I turn now to my second text, Plato’s Phaedrus. It is a dialogue 
between Socrates and his friend Phaedrus on at least three main topics. At 
first the subject is a speech by Lysias, which prompts two speeches by 
Socrates on the nature of love. Then they discuss the nature of rhetoric and, 
finally, the contrast between written and spoken words. What is of particular 
interest to our current investigation is the preamble, where Phaedrus talks 
about the ways in which he can reproduce a speech by Lysias, the leading 
orator at that time.20 When he first meets Socrates while out walking, 
Phaedrus talks as if he has been listening to Lysias’ speech delivered by the 
orator himself (“I have been with Lysias,” he says), but it turns out that he 
has actually been reading a written text of the speech that advises young men 
not to yield to sexual advances from those who are in love with them, but 
rather to ones from those who are not. Socrates sees through Phaedrus’ 
coded language and unmasks the real situation (228a-b):21 
 
[that] he wasn’t content with a single hearing of Lysias’ speech but made 
him repeat it a number of times, and that Lysias willingly complied.  But 
even that didn’t satisfy Phaedrus, and in the end he took the manuscript 
and went over his favourite passages by himself.  Finally, exhausted by 
sitting at this occupation since early morning, he went out for a walk with 
the whole speech, I could swear, firmly in his head, unless it was 
excessively long.  His motive in going outside the walls was to be able to 
declaim it aloud.   
 
A number of interesting observations can be made about this passage.  
Lysias presumably had a written version of his speech, but it was clearly 
meant for oral delivery.22 Phaedrus as a member of the audience may request 
to hear it more than once and try to memorize it or he may obtain the 
manuscript from the author and read it. What he subsequently does seems to 
imply that after studying the speech, what he then wanted to do was to 
deliver it by himself, hopefully to some audience of his own. This seems to 
                                                
20 The dramatic date of the Phaedrus (presumed to be sometime in the late fifth 
century B.C.E.) cannot be determined, as the pieces of internal evidence contradict one 
another. The date of composition is likely to be at a later stage of Plato’s career. Cf. 
Nehamas and Woodruff 1995:xiii-xiv and Rowe 2000:13-14.  
 
21 Translations from the Phaedrus in this article are taken from Hamilton 1973. 
 
22 Cf. Thomas (1992:124): “In public oratory, Greek orators fostered the 
appearance of improvisation and spontaneity, even if they had a text.” 
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imply that the speech must be performed in order to be fully appreciated, 
even by the audience on the receiving end.  
What happens next in the dialogue is equally interesting. Phaedrus 
says that he has not learned the speech by heart, but he can summarize the 
argument point by point for Socrates (228d). Clearly he would have 
preferred to perform a version of the speech orally by himself. But Socrates 
spots that Phaedrus is hiding the manuscript itself under his cloak, and 
insists that he would rather hear “Lysias,” that is, the text itself, read aloud to 
him (228d-e).23 So here are two ways of thinking: (1) speeches have to be 
delivered live but (2) the authentic authorial voice retrieved from the fixed 
text is more desirable than a second-hand re-creation of the performance by 
someone else.  
We are witnessing here an interesting phase of oral culture, when 
written texts have arrived as an optional memory aid and yet the purely oral 
mode of memorizing and reproducing the oral performance is very much 
alive and appears even to be preferred by keen learners. As we have seen in 
Ion, allowance seems to be made for a degree of inaccuracy in the case of 
recall from memory—as long as you get the gist right.24 But this new 
technology—writing—has made it possible to produce the “author himself” 
in the form of the fixed text, and with it we can see the arrival of the new 
concept of authenticity.25   
But Lysias’ speech, read out by Phaedrus, is not the end of the story.  
It triggers Socrates’ own speech (237a-41d) first to outdo it along the same 
lines of argument (you should yield to those who are not in love with you), 
and then another speech (244a-57b) to reverse the conclusion (you should 
yield to those who are in love with you). Unlike Lysias’ written text, which 
has no room for expansion, we are given the picture of Socrates “actually” 
improvising and composing the speeches to respond to immediate questions. 
Plato takes enormous trouble to set the scene (230b-c) on a hot summer day, 
with Socrates and Phaedrus sheltering in the shade of a plane tree under 
                                                
23 Sheid and Svenbro (1996:124-25) observe the sexual connotation of the 
“reader” and the “writer” being under the same cloak, and the implication of this passage 
that the written words become a complete “text” only when woven with a live voice.  
  
24 Cf. Thucydides 1.22, for the same attitude towards oral memory, which he 
utilized to write his set speeches. For lack of precision in oral style, see Gagarin 
1999:166. 
 
25 For the formulation of writing as a technology, see Ong 1988:espec. 80-82, and 
for writing’s effect on the mode of thinking, especially Plato’s, see Havelock 1963. 
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which runs a cool spring sacred to a river god and some nymphs. They lie 
down, listening to the cicadas’ chorus over their heads.26   
It is in this setting that Socrates hears Lysias’ speech read out to him 
and then gives his own in response. He describes himself as “inspired” (or 
“beside myself”; enthousiasô, 241e5) and his style is often poetic, even 
addressing the Muses as he begins his first speech (237a7) and launching 
into hexameter verse at the end of the speech (241d1).27 Although these two 
instances show a very heavy hint of Socratic irony, there is no doubt that 
Plato is trying to bring some element of poetic inspiration into his creation as 
well as to recreate some essence of the live performance of Socratic 
dialectic. A little later in the dialogue (245a) Socrates speaks of poetic 
inspiration in terms similar to those in Ion, though in this instance with no 
obvious irony: “But if a man comes to the door of poetry untouched by the 
madness of the Muses, believing that technique alone will make him a good 
poet, he and his sane compositions never reach perfection, but are utterly 
eclipsed by the performances of the inspired madman.”   
What was the motive for Plato to write this dialogue dotted with many 
poetic expressions? Is it merely play, by which he is confessing that he has a 
soft spot for poetry? Is he being ironic or seriously trying to present Socrates 
as an inspired teacher whose art of philosophy is the true art of the Muses 
that we must follow? And why did Plato write anything at all? As is well 
known, Plato’s attitude toward writing was deeply skeptical. In the Phaedrus 
Socrates relates a myth reputedly from Egypt (274c-75b): the god Theuth 
invents writing but the king of Egypt denounces it as something harmful that 
damages rather than improves one’s memory, and that also can give a large 
quantity of information without proper instruction, which fills the learners 
with the conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom. After telling this story, 
Socrates goes on to express in his own words the inadequacy of writing 
(275d)—it cannot answer any queries, can be misunderstood without the 
author to explain it, and is available even to unsuitable readers.   
These were the very problems that Plato himself faced when 
committing his thoughts to writing, and he gives this warning in his Seventh 
Letter, widely considered to be written either by himself or by a source close 
                                                
26 For a detailed analysis of the significance of the dialogue’s setting, see Ferrari 
1987:espec. 1-36.   
 
27 This incidentally provides further evidence for the extent to which educated 
Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries were imbued with poetry, especially with 
Homeric verse.   
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to him. Concerning his philosophical quest, he says (341c-d; Hamilton 
1973:136): 
 
No treatise by me concerning it exists or ever will exist. It is not 
something that can be put into words like other branches of learning; only 
after long partnership in a common life devoted to this very thing does 
truth flash upon the soul, like a flame (phôs) kindled by a leaping spark 
(pûros), and once it is born there it nourishes itself thereafter. Yet this too 
I know, that if there were to be any oral or written teaching on this matter 
it would best come from me, and that it is I who would feel most deeply 
the harm caused by an inferior exposition.   
 
Here is the same attitude toward writing as we have seen in the 
Phaedrus. The written text cannot answer any queries, but if it has to be 
committed to writing at all it has to come from the author himself.28 That 
certainly explains why Plato did write his works, albeit reluctantly, but why 
did he write dialogues in particular? This is a complex question that may 
never be adequately answered, but one of the possible answers will be his 
need to convey that “flame” (phôs) as he calls it in the Seventh Letter, 
something that one simply cannot put into words. Ideally we should have a 
live performance of philosophical discussion either with Socrates or with 
Plato in order to catch that flame from them. So the second-best thing for the 
author was to attempt to simulate the live performance of dialectic as best as 
he could to foster the habit of doing philosophy in the souls of the readers.29   
At the same time, Plato is also aware that in order for his dialogues to 
have life, to pass on the “flame,” his writing itself will have to have that 
“flame” in the first place. He is aware that his dialogues need to have 
something of the magical quality that Homer and other great poets possess, 
something more than the sum total of questions and answers, doctrines and 
fancy myths.30 He is trying to capture and pass on something beyond 
                                                
28 However, see Edelstein (1966:83) for the subtle difference in attitude to writing 
between the Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter.     
 
29 Cf. Thomas (1992:127): “The texts were reminders, mnemonic aids, for what 
was more accurately propagated and understood through the living performance, from the 
teacher himself.” 
 
30 Plato as an inspired poet is eloquently described in the following words of von 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff regarding the Phaedrus (1920:486; trans. by Nicholson 
1999:88): “Why then does he write, and why does he write this very dialogue? As he tells 
us himself, it is play. And why does he play? Anyone who grasps this dialogue as a 
whole has no difficulty in seeing the answer. He has to write; he is driven by something 
unconscious, an inner force. This too is a divine madness. The poet within drives him to 
124 NAOKO YAMAGATA 
 
technique. In committing his words to writing in a dialogue form, Plato 
could expect his works to be partially learned by heart, or at least read 
aloud,31 which could bring out some essence of his teacher Socrates’ 
“performance,” that is, his discussions with his friends. In this sense, we can 
interpret the format of the dialogue as Plato’s invitation to performance.32 
Whether you simply retrieve it mechanically from the pages or from 
memory, as Phaedrus did with Lysias’ speech, or join in by thinking aloud as 
Socrates did afterwards is left up to us.33   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 From our Platonic evidence taken mainly from the Ion and Phaedrus, 
we can make a number of observations. In Plato’s day, Homeric epics had 
more or less definitive written texts that were available for learners to 
memorize. Not only professional rhapsodes, who were able to recite the 
entire Homeric poems from memory, but also some laypersons knew all or 
sizeable portions of them by heart. Proper recitals had theatrical elements 
that added to the audience’s fascination. However, Homeric texts were more 
casually quoted as an encyclopedic source of knowledge and wisdom either 
                                                                                                                                            
write, and no matter how low he may set the value of poetry, he lets poetry flourish just 
as, now, he has let rhetoric flourish. On one condition: one must have recognized the 
truth and be prepared to defend it (278c), one must have that goal before one’s eyes and 
seek with all one’s might to accomplish in words that which will please the gods (273e). 
Wisdom belongs to God alone, but we can all become lovers of wisdom.”  
 
31 Cf. Ryle 1966 for the view that most of Plato’s dialogues were composed to be 
orally delivered.  For evidence indicating that written texts were normally read aloud, see 
Thomas 1992:4.   
 
32 Clay (1992:117) points out the effect of the dialogue form that invites the 
reader to be “the audience of a philosophical drama” and to “imitate—or impersonate— 
the speakers of a dialogue.” For a comprehensive discussion of ancient evidence relating 
to Plato’s dialogues as performance texts (either for recitation or theatrical performance), 
see Charalabopoulos 2001. For dramatic elements in Plato’s work, see Tarrant 1955.  
   
33 Regarding these choices, see Notopoulos (1938:478): “The memory which 
Plato advocates, it will be seen, is not the memory of the written word, which is simply a 
static and retentive memory, but the creative memory of the oral literature which is vital 
and synonymous with thinking itself” and Ferrari (1987:214): “what matters most is that 
we do philosophy rather than merely go for its effects, follow Socrates rather than 
Phaedrus.” Also see Sayre (1988:108-9) for the view that Plato’s dialogues invite the 
reader’s active participation in the discovery of the truth.    
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in daily conversation (as Plato depicted) or in writing (as in Plato’s own) and 
on such occasions a considerable degree of departure from the texts was 
permitted, though the sense of the “fixed” text evidently existed.  
 Further evidence suggests that education in Plato’s day largely 
consisted of memorizing Homer. That education then furnished some (such 
as Plato and Socrates) with the ability to spin out a line or two in hexameter 
verse. It is likely that the internalized rhythmic patterns have a certain 
momentum that facilitates words to come out in verse, a process that the 
Greeks might have associated with inspiration. Cross-cultural evidence also 
seems to be consistent with the observation that memorization is at the basis 
of “inspired” poetic creativity.  
From the Phaedrus we can also learn that orators delivered their 
speeches live even when they had the option of composing and keeping the 
text in writing or reading from a written text. The mode of reception, 
however, is varied. It is acknowledged that the author’s live performance is 
the ideal since the audience can pose questions directly to the author.  
Members of the audience may try to memorize as much of the speech as 
they can and pass that on to another audience orally, or obtain its written text 
and either learn it by heart to deliver it or to read the text out for themselves 
or for others. In other words, literary texts, both poetic and rhetorical, are 
primarily something to be performed, something to be brought to life with 
the help of living voice. This is undoubtedly the habit that Plato could count 
on in his contemporary readership when he wrote his philosophical 
dialogues. Plato’s dialogues are like Homer’s poetry or Lysias’ speeches in 
this respect, though they are not meant for mere oral reproduction of “fixed” 
texts, but rather to invite and inspire living performances of philosophy.   
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